Since before Operation Iraqi Freedom started, something bothered me about the assumptions apparent in the planning as revealed by what we were told. The major thing that bothered me was the notion that this war would be a fast one, that we’d show the Iraqi people the futility of fighting us and they’d be so over awed that they would surrender in droves. Gulf War I was used as an example of mass Iraqi military personnel surrendering to emphasize their point. Back in January I even commented that there are some fundamental differences between GWI and GWII. In GWI we fought against the normal Iraqi military, not the vaulted Republican Guard. The notion that the RG would fold as easy as normal military was I thought somewhat foolish. Secondly, our goals were different in GWI, and this does matter. Pushing a country out of another country isn’t the same as invading that country. In an invasion, a soldier who would surrender if being pushed out of another country may choose to fight instead, to defend his homeland. Not everybody in Iraq hates Saddam. And I suppose that some people who are on the fence about Saddam would fight for their country in the face of an invasion.

It’s often said that the generals of a current war are always fighting yesterday’s war, never today’s. I think this time around we are fighting tomorrow’s war instead of today’s. This article from Slate, The Flaw in Shock and Awe, talks about a new concept referred to as transformational warfare or Effects-Based Planning. It seems to me that the very fundamental differences I mentioned above between GWI and GWII were entirely ignored. The entire thrust of Effects-Based Planning seems geared to work on a country at least as dependant on high tech as we are. Did nobody think that maybe a 3rd world country would have well used fallbacks for maintaining Command and Control, never having the luxury of becoming used to the high tech military infrastructure we take for granted? I also wonder what these high level planners, Rumsfeld included, think about the people of Iraq. Why would people who believe in their leader and in the sovereignty of their country roll over after a technical demonstration of our superior ability to hit targets with precision from the air? They know full well our goal isn’t to wipe every living thing from the face of Iraq from the air. They know that to occupy them, or as we call it “liberate” them, we will have to move in with ground forces. Nothing about Effects-Based Planning seems to apply to a large scale ground invasion where seizing and holding territory is paramount to success. I think it was a mistake to ignore the old school generals who thought we’d need a massive ground force to accomplish Operation Iraqi Freedom. We’ll probably be able to win without it, but having it would probably have had far more of an effect than “shock and awe” alone.